Free Legal Help in Connecticut

Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, 349 Conn. 35

Construing § 16-262e(c), the Supreme Court held that a landlord of a master-metered multiunit building bears liability for the building's utility costs and may not use ratio utility billing to pass those costs through to tenants, because a tenant may not be made liable for service that is not individually metered for that tenant's exclusive use; the section is to be construed liberally in favor of tenant protection. The Court's analysis also confirms the statute's premise that where the landlord fails to pay, an occupant may take service in his or her own name and deduct a reasonable estimate of the cost attributable to other units.

Cited on: Landlord Refusing to Turn On the Heat in Winter · No Written Lease and No Electricity in a Rental Unit

Barash v. Lembo, 348 Conn. 264 (2023)

To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty a plaintiff must establish (1) a fiduciary relationship giving rise to a duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. Self-dealing is NOT a required element — a trustee's duties of loyalty, care, prudence and impartiality extend beyond the prohibition on self-dealing, and a breach of any of them is actionable (overruling contrary authority requiring an allegation of self-dealing). A trustee also has a duty to take reasonable steps to identify and remedy a prior or coordinate fiduciary's breaches, including compelling an executor to transfer property and enforcing claims on the trust's behalf, and that duty is not suspended merely because the assets have not yet been transferred and the trustee lacks legal title.

Cited on: When an Estate Attorney Contacts a Family Member Against Instructions

Barash v. Lembo, 348 Conn. 264

A breach of fiduciary duty claim against a TRUSTEE does not require an allegation of self-dealing; the elements are (1) a fiduciary relationship giving rise to a duty, (2) breach of that duty — including the duty of prudence and the duty to protect and collect trust property and to address a predecessor or co-fiduciary's misconduct, (3) causation, and (4) damages. The Court overruled contrary Appellate Court precedent requiring an allegation of self-dealing. It expressly left open what elements apply to non-trustee fiduciaries.

Cited on: Conservator Sold a Conserved Person's Home Without Notice

Cammarota v. Guerrera, 148 Conn. App. 743, 87 A.3d 1134 (2014)

An attorney's mishandling of client funds — here, delivering to a third party a check payable to the client after the client had voiced concerns about that third party — can support a professional-negligence/legal-malpractice claim, and expert testimony on the standard of care is not required where the act complained of is within the ordinary knowledge of jurors; proximate cause on those facts was a question for the jury, so the directed verdict on the malpractice count was reversed. But the SAME conduct did not establish breach of fiduciary duty: not every breach of duty in an attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary breach, which concerns loyalty and honesty, and absent evidence of fraud, self-dealing or a conflict of interest the directed verdict for the attorney on the fiduciary-duty count was affirmed.

Cited on: When an Estate Attorney Contacts a Family Member Against Instructions

Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Bristol Heights Associates, LLC, 142 Conn. App. 390, 70 A.3d 74 (2013)

A title insurer's obligations to an insured are governed by the terms of the title policy and may be adjudicated in a declaratory judgment action brought by the insurer. Where the insured failed to cooperate with the insurer's coverage investigation and paid the disputed tax lien under protest without the insurer's consent, the trial court properly found the insured had breached the policy's conditions and thereby prejudiced the insurer, relieving the insurer of its coverage obligation. Judgment for the insurer affirmed.

Cited on: Filing Your Appearance While a Title Insurer Stays Silent

Crismale v. Walston, 184 Conn. App. 1, 194 A.3d 301 (2018)

Sets out the elements of a Connecticut defamation claim: the defendant published a defamatory statement; the statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; it was published to a third person; and the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result. Truth is a complete defense. A qualified privilege — including the privilege for a good-faith report to law enforcement — is defeated only by a showing of actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth) or malice in fact (bad faith or improper motive); a merely negligent misstatement does not suffice, and evidence of bad motive alone does not establish actual malice. Whether a statement is fact or opinion is a question of law. Applying these rules the Appellate Court AFFIRMED summary judgment for the defendant on both slander and malicious prosecution.

Cited on: Defending a Defamation Claim Over General Social Media Posts

Dunn v. Northeast Helicopters Flight Services, LLC, 346 Conn. 360 (2023)

Connecticut recognizes a narrow common-law exception to at-will employment: a discharge is actionable only where the employee identifies an important public policy, drawn from a statutory, constitutional, or judicial source, that the discharge contravened. In Dunn the Supreme Court found that policy in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-73(b), held that the 'sum of money' an employer may not demand as a condition of continued employment need not derive from the employment itself (it may come from a separate business arrangement), and reversed summary judgment for the employer so the wrongful-discharge claim could proceed. Dunn illustrates that the exception requires an identifiable public-policy source; it says nothing about, and does not create a claim for, a discharge motivated by an employer's fear of adverse publicity.

Cited on: Can a Connecticut Employer Fire You Over Bad Publicity?

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017)

A company that purchases defaulted debt and then collects it for its own account is not a 'debt collector' under the FDCPA's 'owed or due another' definition in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), because that clause reaches third-party collection agents rather than debt owners collecting on their own behalf; how the owner acquired the debt does not matter. The Court expressly did NOT decide two other routes to debt-collector status: whether such a company might qualify as a debt collector by acting as a third-party collection agent for others, and whether it might qualify under the separate 'principal purpose' clause of § 1692a(6), which covers a business whose principal purpose is the collection of debts.

Cited on: Stopping Collection Contacts Over a Disputed Online Charge

Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, 61 Conn. App. 329, 764 A.2d 199 (2001)

To establish constructive eviction as a defense to a claim for unpaid rent, a tenant must prove three elements: (1) the landlord's own act or omission rendered the premises untenantable; (2) the tenant vacated because of that untenantability; and (3) the tenant gave the landlord a reasonable time to remedy the condition. Failure on any element defeats the defense. In Heritage Square the commercial tenant lost: the Appellate Court affirmed judgment for the landlord because the tenant did not show the landlord caused the sewage problem, did not show he vacated because of it (he left under a stipulated judgment in a summary process action), and did not allow a reasonable time to cure.

Cited on: Rent and Early-Termination Fees After a Connecticut Building Is Condemned

In re Andrews' Appeal from Probate, 78 Conn. App. 429, 826 A.2d 1260 (2003)

A clear and ongoing conflict of interest between a fiduciary and the beneficiaries can render the fiduciary "incapable of executing such fiduciary's trust" within General Statutes § 45a-242(a) and justify removal. A merely potential conflict does not compel removal; what is required is a demonstrated, continuing conflict rendering the fiduciary unfit. Removal was affirmed where the attorney-fiduciary had drafted the instruments naming himself, then generated protracted litigation over his own fees against the estate, producing an acrimonious relationship that compromised his ability to represent the beneficiaries fairly.

Cited on: When an Estate Attorney Contacts a Family Member Against Instructions

Mangiante v. Niemiec, 82 Conn. App. 277

The Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (§§ 45a-557 through 45a-560b) establishes a fiduciary relationship between the custodian of a custodial account and the minor. A custodian who spends custodial funds to satisfy the custodian's own obligation — there, the custodian's court-ordered child support payments — breaches that fiduciary duty; and where a complaint against a fiduciary alleges self-dealing, the fiduciary carries the burden of proving fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence rather than by a fair preponderance.

Cited on: Who Controls a Child's Custodial CD at Age Eighteen

Matter of P. Singh, 27 I&N Dec. 598 (BIA 2019)

The standard of proof necessary to bar approval of a visa petition based on marriage fraud under INA § 204(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c), is "substantial and probative evidence." That degree of proof is more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than clear and convincing evidence — the evidence must show it is more than probably true that the marriage is fraudulent. The nature, quality, quantity and credibility of the fraud evidence must be considered in its totality, and both direct and circumstantial evidence may be considered; circumstantial evidence alone may suffice.

Cited on: Responding to a USCIS Marriage Fraud Notice After Adjustment of Status

Murphy v. Wakelee, 247 Conn. 396

In a claim against a conservator for breach of fiduciary duty, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence only where the complaint alleges fraud, self-dealing, or conflict of interest; where the claim is essentially one of negligent administration with no such allegation, the plaintiff retains the ordinary burden and no burden-shifting instruction is required. The Court declined to create a special exception for conservators, reasoning that the Probate Court's supervisory authority over the conservator already protects the ward's estate.

Cited on: Conservator Sold a Conserved Person's Home Without Notice

Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 119 S. Ct. 685, 142 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1999) (per curiam)

A plaintiff bringing a claim under EMTALA's stabilization provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b), need not prove that the hospital acted with an improper motive (such as one based on indigency, race, or sex) in failing to stabilize. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's contrary rule, reasoning that unlike subsection (a), the text of subsection (b) contains no 'appropriate' standard and no motive condition — it requires only such further examination and treatment as may be required to stabilize the condition.

Cited on: EMTALA and ADA Claims After Being Forced From an Emergency Room

Sender v. Sender, 56 Conn. App. 492

Where a dispute over a minor's custodial account arises within a dissolution action already before the Superior Court, that court has jurisdiction to order the custodian to restore the accounts to their original amounts and may hold the custodian in contempt for failing to comply; the Probate Court's jurisdiction over custodial accounts is not exclusive in that circumstance.

Cited on: Who Controls a Child's Custodial CD at Age Eighteen

State v. Cody M., 337 Conn. 92

Separate acts during a single encounter with a protected person can support separate counts of criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order without offending double jeopardy: where the defendant first whispered to the victim and asked why she had blocked his calls (violating the no-contact provision) and then said she would have problems and mouthed that he would kill her (violating the no-threatening provision), the statements, though made in quick succession, were two distinct acts violating two different conditions of the order.

Cited on: Defending Harassment 2nd and a Protective Order Violation

State v. King, 346 Conn. 238

Comparing Connecticut's 'operating' element with Florida's 'actual physical control' element for purposes of the § 14-227a(g) enhancement, the Supreme Court restated Connecticut law: 'operation' is any act that, alone or in sequence, will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle, even if a temporary obstacle or impediment remains and even if the engine is not running and the vehicle is not moving, so long as the defendant is in the vehicle. Under Connecticut case law an individual does not violate the statute 'by merely sitting or sleeping in the driver's seat of a vehicle while intoxicated'; the presence of a key in the ignition supports a finding of operation but is not required if other indicia are present, and a court must look at all the relevant facts to determine whether the fact finder reasonably could infer that the defendant was in a position to overcome a temporary obstacle to make the vehicle operative.

Cited on: Second DUI Charge After Sleeping in a Parked Car

State v. Perez, 173 Conn. App. 40

On a motion for the return of property seized at the time of arrest, the Appellate Court held that an in rem forfeiture proceeding under § 54-33g is not required for property seized incident to an arrest — the disposition may be made within the criminal proceeding under § 54-36a(c) — and that the movant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to the property and of providing an adequate record. Where the trial court had already adjudicated the items contraband and ordered them destroyed, and that ruling was not appealed, it became the law of the case and a later judge was not obliged to revisit it.

Cited on: Getting a Seized Vehicle Back When No Charges Are Filed

State v. Pilch, 35 Conn. Supp. 536, 394 A.2d 1364 (Super. Ct., App. Sess. 1977)

Where a defendant pleaded guilty to issuing a bad check in violation of General Statutes § 53a-128 in respect of a corporate check he signed as an officer, the court could order him personally to pay restitution in the face amount of the check as a condition of probation: he was a "representative drawer" within § 53a-118(10), he was personally charged and personally pleaded guilty, and the corporate form did not shield him. Restitution as a probation condition is authorized by § 53a-30, and great discretion is allowed in setting probation conditions. Judgment affirmed ("There is no error").

Cited on: Liability After a Retailer Cashes a Paycheck That Is Returned

State v. Vlahos, 138 Conn. App. 379, 51 A.3d 1173 (2012)

Affirming a conviction for operating a motor vehicle without a driver's license in violation of General Statutes § 14-36(a), the Appellate Court held that an information tracking the statutory section and subsection was sufficient even though it did not separately recite the "public highway" element, because an information not challenged before verdict is construed liberally in favor of the state and is valid unless so defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense.

Cited on: Fingerprinting After a Stop for Driving Without a Valid License

Stratford Police Dept. v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, 343 Conn. 62

An out-of-state conviction is not an automatic, per se bar to a Connecticut pistol permit. The offenses enumerated in § 29-28(b) as conviction-based disqualifiers are all Connecticut statutes, and the legislature's omission of any out-of-state-equivalency language — which it has included in other statutes — means only a felony or one of the enumerated Connecticut offenses operates as a per se bar. An out-of-state conviction (there, a New York ketamine possession misdemeanor) may nonetheless be weighed by the issuing authority and the Board in the discretionary 'suitable person' determination, and on UAPA review a court may not substitute its judgment for the Board's factual and credibility findings where they are supported by substantial evidence.

Cited on: Connecticut Pistol Permit Eligibility and Suitability Review

Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93

In a trademark owner's suit against an online marketplace, the Second Circuit affirmed judgment for eBay on direct and contributory trademark infringement: for contributory liability under Inwood, 'a service provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.' General awareness of counterfeiting on the platform, and a failure to proactively police or authenticate, do not create liability where the platform removes listings it is told about.

Cited on: Suing an Online Marketplace Over Counterfeit Coins

Van Eck v. Cimahosky, 329 F. Supp. 2d 265

In a suit arising from a search and seizure by law enforcement, the District of Connecticut held that Bivens claims are analogous to § 1983 claims and are governed by the forum state's tort limitations period — in Connecticut, the three-year period of § 52-577 — and dismissed claims against unidentified 'John Doe' defendants who were not named before that period expired.

Cited on: Suing Over a 1998 Federal Investigation: Timeliness

Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004)

In a wrongful-death action against a child-placement agency arising from the death of a child in a licensed caregiver's day care, the Connecticut Supreme Court AFFIRMED summary judgment FOR the agency, holding it owed the child no duty of care. The class protected by the mandated-reporter statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-101, is limited to children who have actually been abused or neglected and about whom a report has been or should have been made; a mandated reporter owes no legally enforceable duty to other, unidentified children who might only indirectly benefit from a report. Foreseeability alone does not establish duty, and the Court held that public-policy considerations — the risk of over-reporting and the strain on limited investigative resources — weigh against extending liability.

Cited on: Suing Connecticut DCF Over a Placement With a Convicted Caregiver