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Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2000)

An owner who entrusts a vehicle to another is vicariously liable for its negligent operation; the doctrine reaches a person with an identifiable property interest in the vehicle.

Cited on: Car Owner's Liability When a Vehicle Is Taken Without Permission · Claiming Against a Company Whose Driver Was Not Authorized · A shareholder named in a crash lawsuit against the company +5 more

Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920)

Pedigree only: the dangerous instrumentality doctrine dates to this decision.

Cited on: Car Owner's Liability When a Vehicle Is Taken Without Permission · Claiming Against a Company Whose Driver Was Not Authorized · Owner's Liability for a Learner's-Permit Driver's Crash

Birge v. Charron, 107 So. 3d 350 (Fla. 2012)

The rear driver is presumed negligent; the presumption is rebuttable by evidence such as a mechanical failure or a sudden, unexpected or illegal stop by the lead vehicle, and comparative fault governs once it is rebutted.

Cited on: Rear-End Suit When the Police Report Blames the Other Driver · Rear-Ending a Trailer With No Working Lights

Clampitt v. D.J. Spencer Sales, 786 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2001)

The abrupt-stop rebuttal: a stop at a place and in a manner the following driver had no reason to anticipate.

Cited on: Rear-End Suit When the Police Report Blames the Other Driver · Rear-Ending a Trailer With No Working Lights

Emerson v. Lambert, 374 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2023)

One vicarious pocket: where the titleholder is vicariously liable, a family-member bailee is not also vicariously liable, and the owner's dangerous-instrumentality exposure is the capped exposure under § 324.021(9)(b)3.

Cited on: Owner Liability When an Unlisted Driver Crashes Your Car · Owner's Liability for a Learner's-Permit Driver's Crash

Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993)

The doctrine's limit — no owner liability where the vehicle was taken without consent, by theft or conversion.

Cited on: Car Owner's Liability When a Vehicle Is Taken Without Permission · Claiming Against a Company Whose Driver Was Not Authorized

Mayo v. Allen, 973 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)

Conversion is an unauthorized act depriving another of property permanently or for an indefinite time, and may be shown by demand and refusal; a letter seeking money rather than the property's return was no demand, and the owners lost.

Cited on: Getting back property held as collateral after an informal crash deal · A rental company holding your belongings until you pay the deductible

White-Wilson Medical Center v. Dayta Consultants, Inc., 486 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)

A corporation's officers and agents are personally liable for torts they personally commit, even within the scope of their employment; a sole stockholder and officer could not be sued on the corporation's contract or merely as an officer without grounds to pierce the veil.

Cited on: A shareholder named in a crash lawsuit against the company · A utility operator's personal liability for re-energizing downed lines

Ceilia Abramovic v. Dan Abramovic, 188 So. 3d 61 (2016) — District Court of Appeal of Florida

The custodial parent presumptively is entitled to the [tax] exemptions but may release them to the noncustodial parent.

Cited on: Dispute Over Claiming a Child as a Tax Dependent After Relocation

Christensen v. Bowen, 140 So. 3d 498 (Fla. 2014)

A titleholder is a beneficial owner of the vehicle unless title is bare — as where a sale has been completed with delivery — and the titleholder's subjective intent is not what decides ownership; cited here as the cautionary authority a seller still on the title must answer.

Cited on: Sued Over a Car You Sold but Never Took Off the Title

Collins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 775 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2015)

Held, as a matter of first impression, that a consumer need NOT show the disputed information was published to a third party in order to recover actual damages for a CRA's negligent failure to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation under § 1681i(a), because that subsection speaks to the consumer's 'file' rather than to a 'consumer report.' The court also affirmed summary judgment on willfulness, holding that a CRA which verified a disputed debt by sending only an ACDV form to the furnisher and doing nothing else 'might have been negligent, but willfulness or recklessness is a higher standard that has not been met.'

Cited on: Removing an Inaccurate Accident Entry From Your LexisNexis Report

Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984)

The corporate veil may not be pierced absent a showing of improper conduct.

Cited on: A shareholder named in a crash lawsuit against the company

Davis v. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2002)

Delayed discovery applies only where the Legislature provided it (fraud among them); the Court refused to extend it to unjust enrichment, among other claims.

Cited on: A charge for a service you never received, found after your case settled

Goodrich v. Malowney, 157 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)

A refusal to return property avoids conversion only if it is qualified by a disclosed reason that asserts no claim inconsistent with the owner's rights; the holders' refusal there did not qualify.

Cited on: Getting back property held as collateral after an informal crash deal

Hurt v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1980)

Whether a general printed release discharges tortfeasors other than those it specifically names is a question of fact about the parties' intent.

Cited on: A charge for a service you never received, found after your case settled

Integrated Health Care Services, Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002)

A suit against a nursing home limited to violations of the § 400.022 residents' rights, there including alleged failure to prevent falls, is not a medical-negligence claim, so the chapter 766 presuit requirements do not apply.

Cited on: A nursing home resident breaks a hip in a fall

Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 206 L. Ed. 2d 412 (2020)

Holding, in the Court's own words: 'This case presents the question whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investigative traffic stop after running a vehicle's license plate and learning that the registered owner has a revoked driver's license. We hold that when the officer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is reasonable.' The inference is available only so long as the officer lacks information negating it.

Cited on: Stopping a Car Because Its Registered Owner Is Suspended

Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999) (Interim Decision #3423)

The BIA held that under Arizona law aggravated DUI — which requires the driver to know he or she is prohibited from driving — IS a crime involving moral turpitude. In the same decision the Board EXPRESSLY agreed with the immigration judge that simple DUI is not: 'Simple DUI is ordinarily a regulatory offense that involves no culpable mental state requirement,' and 'the offense of driving under the influence under Arizona law does not, without more, reflect conduct that is necessarily morally reprehensible or that indicates such a level of depravity or baseness that it involves moral turpitude.' A simple first-offense misdemeanor DUI without a knowing-prohibition element is therefore not a CIMT under this line of authority.

Cited on: How a First DUI Arrest Affects F-1 Student Status

Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78 (BIA 2001)

The BIA held that Arizona's offense of aggravated DUI with two or more prior DUI convictions is not a crime involving moral turpitude, reaffirming that a simple DUI offense is not a CIMT because it lacks a culpable mental state, and that recidivism alone does not convert it into one. The Board distinguished Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999), where aggravated DUI committed by a driver who knew his license was suspended did involve moral turpitude. A single completed simple DUI conviction therefore should not, standing alone, trigger the CIMT inadmissibility ground.

Cited on: A Single DUI Conviction at a Marriage-Based Green Card Interview

McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992)

Power companies, while not insurers, owe a greater-than-usual duty of care in proportion to the greater-than-usual zone of risk; duty turns on a foreseeable zone of risk, and the foreseeability of the specific injury is a proximate-cause question.

Cited on: A utility operator's personal liability for re-energizing downed lines

Morris v. Muniz, 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018)

In a wrongful-death medical malpractice case, held that (1) where the facts about the presuit expert's qualifications are unrefuted, dismissal for lack of a qualified presuit expert is reviewed DE NOVO, not for abuse of discretion; (2) a court may not dismiss for noncompliance with the informal presuit discovery process without first finding that the noncompliance prejudiced the defendant; and (3) applying §§ 766.202(6) and 766.102(5)(a)2. and (6), an expert affidavit that on its face states the statutory requirements establishes qualification where the defense offers no evidence contradicting it — 'Questioning the veracity of an expert's sworn statements is not the same as presenting evidence that suggests that the claims in the affidavit are false.' The Court quashed the dismissal and ordered the complaint reinstated, reiterating that presuit screening requirements must be construed in a manner that favors access to courts.

Cited on: Beginning a Florida Medical Negligence Wrongful Death Claim

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010)

Defense counsel representing a noncitizen has a Sixth Amendment duty to advise the client of the deportation/immigration consequences of a guilty plea; failure to do so can constitute deficient performance under Strickland. Directly relevant to this person's decision how to resolve the DUI charge — but it is a duty owed at the PLEA stage and says nothing about visa revocation, which is consular discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i).

Cited on: How a First DUI Arrest Affects F-1 Student Status

Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920)

Origin of Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine — cited for pedigree only.

Cited on: Uninsured Permissive Driver Sued After a Left-Turn Crash

State v. Laina, 175 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)

The Fifth District REVERSED an order suppressing evidence and held the stop lawful: once an officer running a license plate 'discovered that the owner of the vehicle he was following had a suspended driver's license, this "articulated fact" gave him a "founded suspicion" that the driver might be driving illegally,' because 'the relevant probability here is that most vehicles are driven by their owners, most of the time.' The court reaffirmed Smith v. State, 574 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), and held that the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Teamer, 151 So. 3d 421 (Fla. 2014), did not impliedly overrule it.

Cited on: Stopping a Car Because Its Registered Owner Is Suspended

Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016)

Held § 440.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009) — which cut off temporary total disability benefits after 104 weeks for a worker who is totally disabled and unable to work but has not yet reached maximum medical improvement — unconstitutional as applied, as a denial of the right of access to courts under article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, because the resulting gap left the compensation scheme no longer a reasonable alternative to tort litigation. As a remedy the Court employed statutory revival, reinstating the pre-1994 limit of up to 260 weeks of temporary total disability benefits.

Cited on: Valuing a Workplace Chemical Burn With Permanent Nerve Damage