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Blood v. Dewey, 318 Mass. 79 (1945) — Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

it is plain that the facts recited by the jury show that they were dealing with a gratuitous undertaking by the defendant

Cited on: Potential Liability for Assisting in a Landlord-Tenant Dispute

Darviris v. Petros, 442 Mass. 274, 812 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 2004)

The negligent provision of medical care, without more, does not give rise to a claim under G.L. c. 93A: a 93A violation requires more than a finding of mere negligence, and a claim that a physician performed a procedure without the patient's consent, standing alone, sounds in negligence/battery rather than in unfair or deceptive practices. The SJC expressly held, however, that this does NOT place all conduct of medical providers beyond c. 93A — the entrepreneurial and business aspects of providing medical services (for example advertising and billing) remain within the statute's reach.

Cited on: Malpractice Claim for a Nerve Block That Was Never Given

Prescott v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 674 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997)

A driver surcharged for being more than 50% at fault may appeal to the Board of Appeal and then obtain judicial review in Superior Court under G.L. c. 175, § 113P, where the Board's decision must be supported by substantial evidence. The Board's finding was VACATED because the mere fact that an accident occurred, the location of the damage to the vehicles, and the other driver's statement that the appellant 'just pulled out in front of me' were not substantial evidence that the appellant failed to stop or failed to proceed with caution — and a regulatory more-than-50%-fault presumption cannot be applied until the predicate fact triggering it is actually found.

Cited on: Appealing an At-Fault Finding as a Junior Operator

Thou v. Russo, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 514, 17 N.E.3d 1113 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014)

A malpractice claim must clear the G.L. c. 231, § 60B tribunal, and a tribunal finding of insufficiency triggers a bond requirement whose non-payment ends the case — but the offer of proof is evaluated with the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, asking only whether the physician's conduct is shown to have departed from good medical practice and caused damage. Where the plaintiff submitted an expert opinion identifying specific anesthetic doses, specific departures from the standard of care, and a causal link to the injury, the tribunal erred in finding the proof insufficient; the dismissal was VACATED and no bond was required.

Cited on: Malpractice Claim for a Nerve Block That Was Never Given