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Cornerstone Hospital of Southeast Arizona v. Blackburn, 231 Ariz. 67, 290 P.3d 460 (App. 2012)

A.R.S. § 12-2604, not Rule 702 alone, governs the admissibility of medical standard-of-care evidence in a case brought under Arizona's Adult Protective Services Act, just as it does under the Medical Malpractice Act. The court reasoned that the interest in ensuring a witness giving medical standard-of-care testimony has sufficient expertise 'is no less compelling' in an action brought on behalf of a vulnerable adult than in an MMA action. A family cannot escape the expert-qualification requirement by recharacterizing a medical-negligence theory as elder neglect under APSA.

Cited on: Hospital Liability for a Fatal Pressure Ulcer in Arizona

Diaz v. Bernini, 246 Ariz. 114, 435 P.3d 457 (2019)

Under A.R.S. § 28-1321 an officer may obtain a blood or breath sample from a DUI arrestee only if the arrestee expressly agrees to the test — but the Arizona Supreme Court held that, apart from any constitutional considerations, THE STATUTE ITSELF DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE AGREEMENT BE VOLUNTARY. The court thereby rejected the court of appeals' contrary rule that an involuntary agreement means the officer lacked a statutory precondition and took the sample unlawfully. A challenge to the voluntariness of consent must therefore be brought under the Fourth Amendment, not as a statutory violation.

Cited on: Arizona DUI Arrest and Blood Draw While Asleep in a Parked Car

Potter v. Arizona Department of Transportation, 204 Ariz. 73, 59 P.3d 837 (App. 2002)

In a civil license-suspension appeal, the court held that an officer can have reasonable grounds to believe a person was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle even where the engine was off and the driver was asleep in the seat, and that the 'safe harbor' recognized in State v. Zavala does not preclude suspension where those reasonable grounds existed. The opinion also collects the governing criminal-side rules: State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324, 897 P.2d 626 (1995), rejected any bright-line test and left actual physical control to the fact finder on the totality of the circumstances; and State ex rel. O'Neill v. Brown, 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995), holds the safe harbor does not shield a defendant from a DRIVING charge if the State proves he drove while intoxicated before relinquishing control.

Cited on: Using a Witness to Challenge the Driving Element of an Arizona DUI

Rasor v. Nw. Hosp., LLC (Rasor II), 243 Ariz. 160, 403 P.3d 572 (Ariz. 2017), affirming on this point Rasor v. Nw. Hosp., LLC (Rasor I), 239 Ariz. 546, 373 P.3d 563 (App. 2016)

In a claim that ICU nursing staff caused a stage IV pressure ulcer by failing to reposition/off-load a patient, the plaintiffs' board-certified wound-care nurse did NOT qualify under A.R.S. § 12-2604 to give standard-of-care testimony, because she had not devoted a majority of her professional time in the preceding year to the same specialty as the defendant's nurses (critical care). The expert-qualification statute is therefore a real threshold obstacle to this kind of nursing-negligence claim. The courts also held, however, that outright summary judgment was too harsh: the plaintiffs were entitled to additional time to secure a qualified standard-of-care expert, and on remand the same nurse was held competent to testify to CAUSATION even though unqualified on standard of care.

Cited on: Hospital Liability for a Fatal Pressure Ulcer in Arizona

State ex rel. O'Neill v. Brown, 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)

The 'driving' element of a DUI may be proven by CIRCUMSTANTIAL evidence. Zavala's protection for a person who stops and gives up control guards against an ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL charge; it does not shield a defendant from a DRIVING charge where the State proves he drove while intoxicated before relinquishing control.

Cited on: Using a Witness to Challenge the Driving Element of an Arizona DUI

State v. Havatone, 241 Ariz. 506, 389 P.3d 1251 (2017)

Arizona's implied-consent 'unconscious clause,' A.R.S. § 28-1321(C), which authorizes nonconsensual warrantless blood draws from unconscious DUI suspects, was held unconstitutional as applied on the facts of that case; the court further held that under Arizona law the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would not save the evidence, and remanded to determine whether Arizona or Nevada law governed. The general principle it rests on is that the implied-consent statute does not by itself substitute for a warrant or a recognized Fourth Amendment exception.

Cited on: Arizona DUI Arrest and Blood Draw While Asleep in a Parked Car

State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324, 897 P.2d 626 (1995)

Actual physical control is decided on the totality of the circumstances by the fact finder; no bright-line test.

Cited on: Using a Witness to Challenge the Driving Element of an Arizona DUI

State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, 371 P.3d 627 (2016)

Where an officer administers the implied-consent admonition by telling a DUI arrestee that 'Arizona law requires you to submit' to testing, proof that the arrestee then submitted does not, standing alone, carry the State's burden of showing free and voluntary Fourth Amendment consent — the officer has invoked lawful authority to compel consent, and the trial court must examine the totality of the circumstances to decide voluntariness even after such an assertion of authority. On the facts, the State failed to carry that burden. The evidence was nonetheless admitted because the admonition had been given in good-faith reliance on then-existing precedent, and the convictions were affirmed.

Cited on: Arizona DUI Arrest and Blood Draw While Asleep in a Parked Car

Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 44 P.3d 990 (2002)

In a professional-malpractice action the limitations period does not begin to run merely because the plaintiff knows she was injured. The court expressly REFUSED the defendant's bright-line 'what and who' rule, holding instead that the 'what' is interpreted broadly enough to require knowledge that would put a reasonable patient or client on notice to investigate whether the injury may be attributable to a professional's negligence, and that when discovery and consequent accrual occurred is ordinarily a question for the jury rather than a matter of law.

Cited on: Wrongful Death From a Missed Bacterial Infection in Arizona