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Aeda v. Aeda, 2013-NMCA-095, 310 P.3d 646

As a matter of first impression, termination of parental rights severs the parent-child relationship completely, including the child-support obligation imposed by a divorce decree. The court reversed the district court's order and dismissed the matter. Two limits are essential when using this: (1) it arose where a court had ALREADY terminated the father's rights in a contested proceeding brought by the mother — it does not let a parent end support by unilaterally offering to relinquish, and New Mexico courts do not terminate parental rights merely so a parent can escape support; and (2) the opinion does not address, and must not be cited for, the treatment of arrearages that accrued before termination.

Cited on: Back Child Support Filed Nine Years After the Relationship

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)

A suspect who wants the protection of the right to remain silent must invoke it UNAMBIGUOUSLY; simply staying silent through a long interrogation does not invoke it. Where no unambiguous invocation occurred, and the prosecution shows the suspect received and understood Miranda warnings, a waiver may be implied from the fact that he then made an uncoerced statement. The practical consequence for this consumer is unfavorable, not favorable: silence followed by an eventual answer generally does NOT get the statement suppressed. A suppression argument here must be built on something else — that warnings were never given or not understood, that the statement was coerced or involuntary, that he was in custody and unwarned, or that he did make a clear invocation officers ignored.

Cited on: Options After Making Self-Incriminating Statements to Police

Classen v. Classen, 893 P.2d 478 (1995) — New Mexico Court of Appeals

We hold that the trial court erred in ruling solely on the record below that Husband’s due process rights were not violated because of improper service of process.

Cited on: Challenging a Custody Order After Improper Service of Papers

Gallagher v. Santa Fe Federal Employees Federal Credit Union, 2002-NMCA-088, 132 N.M. 552, 52 P.3d 412

Holds that a payee's conversion claim against a financial institution that paid checks to someone not entitled to them is governed by the UCC rather than the common law: NMSA 1978, § 55-3-420(a) supplies the conversion cause of action against a depositary or payor bank that takes an instrument bearing a forged indorsement, and NMSA 1978, § 55-3-118(g) supplies the governing THREE-YEAR limitations period, displacing the limitations statutes that would otherwise apply to the plaintiff's common-law negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract theories. The opinion also sets out § 55-3-420(a)'s express bar on suit by a payee or indorsee who never received delivery of the instrument.

Cited on: Bank Liability for Cashing a Check Without the Payee's Endorsement

GandyDancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2019-NMSC-021, 453 P.3d 434

Holds that the private cause of action created by NMSA 1978, § 57-12-10(B) is limited by the zone of interest the Unfair Practices Act protects — 'innocent consumers' — and therefore that the UPA 'does not provide a cause of action for competitive injury claims'; a business may not sue a competitor for lost profits under the Act. In so holding the Court confirmed that the UPA's protections run to consumers injured in a transaction, and it quoted § 57-12-2(D)'s definition of an unfair or deceptive trade practice as a false or misleading statement 'knowingly made' in connection with the sale of goods or services. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which had allowed competitor standing.

Cited on: Is a Dealership's Advertised 'No Payments Until 2026' Promotion Binding?

Human Services Department, Child Support Enforcement Division v. Toney, 444 P.3d 1074 (N.M. Ct. App. 2019)

Retroactive child support under the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act is available even where the father ACKNOWLEDGED paternity informally before any support petition was filed. The father argued the retroactive-support provision could not reach him because he had acknowledged paternity years earlier; the Court of Appeals rejected that reading and affirmed retroactive support running back to the date the parents separated. Because NMSA 1978 § 40-11A-305(A) makes a valid acknowledgment of paternity the equivalent of a court adjudication, acknowledged and adjudicated fathers are treated alike for retroactive support. The court also confirmed that retroactive support is decided case by case and that the father may raise equitable defenses, which the district court must actually consider.

Cited on: Back Child Support Filed Nine Years After the Relationship

Macias v. Southwest Cheese Co., 181 F. Supp. 3d 883 (D.N.M. 2016)

To hold an employer directly liable on a negligence theory for a coworker's harassing conduct, "an employee must present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer knew or should have known about the harassment but failed to stop it." Actual knowledge "generally arises when the plaintiff has reported harassment to management-level employees"; alternatively an employer may be liable for failing to prevent harassment where it had constructive notice that the harasser was a "dangerous employee" who posed a threat to others. Applying that standard, the court GRANTED the employer partial summary judgment because the plaintiff produced no admissible evidence of actual or constructive knowledge — the burden is real and evidentiary, and reports to management-level employees are how it is met. That goes directly to what this consumer must be able to prove and document about her HR and police reports.

Cited on: Employer Inaction After a Coworker's Assault and Stalking

Mira Consulting, Inc. v. Board of Education, Albuquerque Public Schools, 2017-NMCA-009 (N.M. Ct. App., No. 34,486, filed Sept. 27, 2016)

Affirms dismissal under Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA of a declaratory-judgment complaint, holding that New Mexico's Procurement Code did not apply to the contract at issue: 'We agree with the district court that New Mexico's Procurement Code does not apply here and that dismissal ... was appropriate. We therefore affirm.' Illustrates that whether the Code reaches a given contract or entity is itself a threshold question a court must resolve before any question of 'violation' arises.

Cited on: Challenging a Suspected New Mexico Procurement Code Violation

State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018-NMSC-005, 410 P.3d 201

Holds that New Mexico's constitutional and rule-based pretrial detention scheme under the 2016-amended N.M. Const. art. II, § 13 satisfies due process: the State must prove the need for detention by CLEAR AND CONVINCING evidence at a detention hearing, and the defendant has the right to counsel, to testify, and to cross-examine witnesses who appear — but due process does NOT require the State to present live witnesses, and it may proceed by proffer, documents and court records. The Court emphasized that liberty is the norm and pretrial detention 'the carefully limited exception,' and that a detention court must weigh both the accused's personal rights and the public interest.

Cited on: Long Pretrial Detention and a Denied Request to Change Lawyers

State v. Martinez, 2020-NMSC-005, 457 P.3d 254

Holds that an experienced officer's observation of two brief vehicle encounters consistent with hand-to-hand drug transactions, at a location the officer knew from personal undercover experience to be a frequent site of drug sales, supplied the 'particularized and objective basis' required for a Terry stop. The Court held that officers need not be certain conduct is criminal, need not rule out innocent explanations before making a brief investigatory stop, and that 'the possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.' The Supreme Court REVERSED the Court of Appeals — which had found only an 'unparticularized hunch' — and affirmed the district court's denial of suppression. The defendant lost.

Cited on: Was There Reasonable Suspicion for a Suspected Hand-to-Hand Stop?

State v. Melendrez, 2014-NMCA-062 (2014) — New Mexico Court of Appeals

We hold that these convictions do not violate Defendant’s double jeopardy rights and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the district court.

Cited on: Understanding a Settlement Conference in a Felony Criminal Case

State v. Nanco, 2012-NMCA-109, 288 P.3d 527 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), cert. granted, 2012-NMCERT-010

Holds that the presentence-confinement credit provided by NMSA 1978, §§ 31-18-15.3 and 31-20-12 applies ONLY to a serious youthful offender who is sentenced as an adult, and does NOT apply to a child adjudicated a delinquent offender and given a juvenile disposition. The child there — charged with first degree murder at fifteen but found to have committed the lesser delinquent acts of voluntary manslaughter and tampering with evidence — was DENIED credit for the twenty-five months he had spent in juvenile detention. The court reasoned that because the credit statute speaks of a 'sentence,' and § 31-18-15.3 grants credit specifically to serious youthful offenders who receive a sentence, the Legislature did not intend § 31-20-12 credit to reach juvenile dispositions.

Cited on: Do Juveniles Get Credit for Time Served on a Commitment?

State v. Widmer, 2020-NMSC-007, 461 P.3d 881

Holds that the Quarles public-safety exception APPLIED and that the defendant's un-Mirandized statement ('I have meth') was ADMISSIBLE. An officer's pre-pat-down question — 'Is there anything on your person that I should know about?' — asked of a handcuffed suspect before Miranda warnings, fell within the exception because of the need to determine whether the suspect was armed or carrying harmful drug paraphernalia. The Supreme Court REVERSED the Court of Appeals, which had held the statement should have been suppressed.

Cited on: Miranda Warnings and Recorded Evidence at a Retrial

Taylor v. Taylor, 737 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2013)

On appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit, which had affirmed the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that a debt one former spouse owed the other arising out of their divorce — there, a judgment for spousal support overpayments — was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), and separately affirmed dismissal of the claim that the same debt was a nondischargeable "domestic support obligation" under § 523(a)(5) because the creditor spouse had not alleged facts showing the debt was in the nature of support for him. The opinion sets out the governing framework: whether an obligation is "in the nature of support" is a question of federal law resolved by a dual inquiry into the parties' intent at the time of the agreement and the substance of the obligation, looking past the labels in the settlement agreement, with the party asserting nondischargeability bearing the burden by a preponderance. That is exactly the analysis for whether this consumer's ex-husband's MSA mortgage and vehicle obligation survives his bankruptcy.

Cited on: Enforcing Divorce Payments After Your Ex Files Bankruptcy