Free Legal Help in Idaho

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002)

The First Amendment protects fictitious, virtual, or non-photographic depictions that merely appear to show minors in sexually explicit conduct where no actual child was used in production. The Court struck down as overbroad the Child Pornography Prevention Act's "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions because they reached material that was neither obscene under Miller nor produced with a real child, and so fell outside both the obscenity exception and the New York v. Ferber child-protection rationale. Obscene material remains wholly unprotected, so the decision does not immunize material that independently satisfies the Miller test.

Cited on: Federal Obscenity Law and Private Non-Photographic Drawings

Bottum v. Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification Central Sex Offender Registry, 154 Idaho 182, 296 P.3d 388 (2013)

The Idaho Supreme Court held that a 2009 amendment to the Sex Offender Registration Act, which foreclosed an opportunity to petition the court for exemption from the duty to register that had previously been available, applied to an offender who could have petitioned before the amendment took effect but did not do so until afterward. The court rejected the argument that applying the amendment violated Idaho Code § 73-101 (no retroactivity unless expressly declared), reasoning that SORA expressly declared itself retroactive (I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d)) and that subsequent amendments to an expressly retroactive act are likewise retroactive. The judgment against the offender was affirmed.

Cited on: Petitioning for Removal From Idaho's Sex Offender Registry

Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 200 L. Ed. 2d 805 (2018)

A driver in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even though the rental agreement does not list him as an authorized driver. The touchstone is the right to exclude others; one who lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of that right, and a Fourth Amendment privacy interest need not rest on formal legal authorization from the owner. The Court expressly reserved the case of a person whose possession is wrongful — a car thief would have no such expectation — and remanded for consideration of whether Byrd's possession was so wrongful as to defeat it.

Cited on: Sober-Living Room Search and Felony Warrants After Move-Out

Dunlap v. State, 516 P.3d 987 (Idaho Aug. 30, 2022) (Docket No. 47179)

States the governing standards for post-conviction relief: the petitioner must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, and the district court's factual findings stand unless clearly erroneous. On ineffective assistance, the court applies Strickland — deficient performance measured against an objective standard of reasonableness, with a strong presumption that counsel's tactical decisions were sound and will not be second-guessed absent inadequate preparation or ignorance of the law, plus a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed. On Brady, the petitioner must show the evidence was favorable, that the State suppressed it, and prejudice; there is no suppression where the defense already knew of or had the means to discover the evidence. Prejudice is assessed on the totality of the evidence, considering alleged deficiencies cumulatively rather than in isolation.

Cited on: Post-Conviction Relief and Civil Rights Claims After a Drug Conviction

Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 280 P.3d 740 (2012)

Under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive remedy rule, an employee injured in the course of employment generally may not sue a CO-EMPLOYEE in negligence where the co-employee was also acting in the course of employment; co-employee immunity requires some connection between the defendant's acts and the employment. Applying the traveling-employee doctrine — an employee who must travel for work remains within the course and scope of employment throughout the trip except during a distinct personal departure, and work performed partly for personal reasons and partly to serve the employer remains within scope — the Court affirmed summary judgment against an injured salesman who sued the co-worker driving on a company errand, both men having received workers' compensation benefits.

Cited on: Workers' Compensation and Suing a Customer Who Injured You

Hansen v. White, 163 Idaho 851, 420 P.3d 996 (2018)

Service is insufficient under Idaho R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) where the summons and complaint are left with a relative at an address that is not the defendant's actual current residence. "Usual place of abode" means the defendant's current residence, not a last known address — an address appearing on the defendant's driver's license and on a collision report is not sufficient to make that address his dwelling or usual place of abode where the evidence shows he had not lived there for years. Separately, where a defendant is not served within six months of the filing of the complaint the action must be dismissed without prejudice unless the plaintiff shows good cause for the delay under I.R.C.P. 4(b)(2); good cause is a factual determination made on the totality of the circumstances WITHIN the six-month period, and a first service attempt made sixteen days before the deadline, reliance on outdated address information, a brief internet search, and an improperly ordered service by publication did not establish it. The Court affirmed dismissal.

Cited on: How to Structure an Idaho Motion to Quash for Insufficient Service

In re Guardianship of Copenhaver (Irwin v. Celeya), 124 Idaho 888, 865 P.2d 979 (1993)

A guardianship of a minor is not a termination of parental rights and does not permanently sever the parent-child relationship; a parent whose child is under guardianship may seek to have custody restored. Idaho courts apply a presumption favoring the natural parent over a nonparent in a custody or guardianship contest, which the nonparent may overcome only by showing abandonment, unfitness, or that the child has been in the nonparent's custody for an appreciable period of time. The court's authority to appoint a guardian for a minor is defined strictly by statute rather than by general equitable discretion, and where the statutory predicate for appointment is not met the court must dismiss or otherwise act in the minor's best interest. Applying that framework, the Supreme Court REVERSED the permanent guardianship awarded to the nonrelative petitioners and remanded with directions to terminate the guardianship and return the children to their mother, because she had made her whereabouts known and was willing and able to care for them.

Cited on: Seeking Guardianship of a Relative's Children in Idaho

Murray v. Dalton (In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Jane Doe), 558 P.3d 1057 (Idaho 2024) (Docket No. 51314, decided Nov. 7, 2024)

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a magistrate court's refusal to terminate a guardianship held by the child's grandmother and step-grandfather over the mother's objection, and held: (1) the Idaho Parental Rights Act, Idaho Code § 32-1013, applies only to governmental conduct and does not apply to a guardianship petition brought by private parties, so strict scrutiny does not govern the guardianship statutes as applied to a private petition — rational basis does, and §§ 15-5-209 and 15-5-212 survive it; (2) the burden of proof in a permanent guardianship proceeding is preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence, which is reserved for termination of parental rights because that is a permanent severance while a guardianship only changes who cares for the child during minority; (3) Idaho Code § 15-5-212 must be read together with § 15-5-204, so the same threshold harm finding (termination, neglect, abuse, abandonment, or no stable home) is required; (4) the parental-preference presumption limits best-interests review unless the nonparent shows abandonment, unfitness, or that the child has been in the nonparent's custody for an appreciable period; and (5) the Overholser rule giving a parent's wishes "special weight" depends on the parent being fit and does not apply once unfitness is found. Courts apply the Idaho Code § 32-717 factors, plus all relevant factors, in determining a minor ward's best interests, and § 15-5-212 is not void for vagueness.

Cited on: Seeking Guardianship of a Relative's Children in Idaho

Nelson v. Property Management Services, Inc., 105 Idaho 578, 671 P.2d 1041 (1983)

A default judgment entered in the small claims department of the magistrate division may be vacated and set aside, and the decision to do so rests in the court's discretion and is disturbed on review only where an abuse of discretion is clearly apparent. Relief is proper where the record shows both a meritorious defense and excusable neglect grounded in a mistake of FACT rather than a mistake of law — in Nelson, the defendant's attorney had misinformed it of the trial time, so its late appearance was excusable, and the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order setting the default judgment aside.

Cited on: Answering an Idaho Small Claims Suit Within 21 Days

Smith v. Smith (In re Estate of Smith), 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018)

Two independent holdings useful here. (1) Under Idaho Code § 15-12-201(1) of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, a power of attorney that does not EXPRESSLY authorize gift-making does not permit the agent to make gratuitous transfers of the principal's property; transfers made without that express grant were correctly invalidated. (2) A rebuttable presumption of undue influence arises where a beneficiary of the instrument was also a fiduciary of the person who executed it, and where the record shows a nexus between the fiduciary role and the instrument's creation; once the presumption applies, the fiduciary bears the burden to rebut it, and failure to do so supports invalidating the instrument.

Cited on: Challenging a Sibling's Power of Attorney Over an Incapacitated Parent

State v. Calver, 155 Idaho 207, 307 P.3d 1233 (Ct. App. 2013)

To convict under Idaho Code § 18-4506(1), the State must prove the defendant acted intentionally and 'without lawful authority' — an element separate from the act of taking, keeping, or withholding. 'Without lawful authority' is not defined in the statute; its plain meaning is action taken without the right or permission to act legally on another's behalf, or the exercise of that right in a way contrary to or not permitted by law. A parent's fundamental constitutional right to make decisions about the child does not immunize conduct taken outside the limits of a valid court order restricting that right, and the State need not show that the order itself used language mirroring the criminal statute or warned of criminal penalties. Conviction affirmed.

Cited on: Custodial Interference Charges When a Parent Withholds a Child

State v. Lantis, 165 Idaho 427, 447 P.3d 875 (2019)

Idaho Code § 18-6409 is a crime against the PUBLIC peace and does not reach conduct that merely disturbs a victim's private, internal, emotional peace. Reading the statute as a whole and in light of its 1864 origins in the 'crimes against public peace' chapter, conduct such as 'traducing' must occur in a public arena or be communicated to the public in a way that disturbs the public peace. Sending sexually suggestive photographs of an ex-girlfriend to her employer — conduct the Court called offensive and even reprehensible — fell outside the statute, and the defendant was entitled to judgment of acquittal; the conviction was vacated.

Cited on: Defending an Idaho Disturbing the Peace Misdemeanor Charge

State v. McGraw & Killeen, 163 Idaho 736, 418 P.3d 1245 (Ct. App. 2018)

Applying Rodriguez v. United States and State v. Linze, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a drug-dog sniff conducted DURING a still-ongoing lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment where the stop's purpose was not abandoned — there, one officer took over and continued writing the citation while a second conducted the sniff, so the sniff added no time. The opinion also states the converse rule that governs this consumer's situation: 'a drug-dog sniff conducted after an otherwise-completed traffic stop is unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion for the sniff,' and authority for the seizure ends when the tasks tied to the infraction are, or reasonably should have been, completed.

Cited on: Suppressing Evidence After a Stop Prolonged for a Dog Sniff

State v. Meyers, 164 Idaho 620, 434 P.3d 224 (2019)

The Sixth Amendment includes a right to proceed pro se, but the request must be clear, unequivocal, and timely, and the trial court must make the defendant aware of the problems inherent in self-representation so that any waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent. Applying the totality of the circumstances, the Idaho Supreme Court AFFIRMED the conviction, holding that although Meyers clearly invoked self-representation in a letter to the court, he later abandoned that request and waived the right by his subsequent conduct — he never notified the other parties, never reminded the court despite many opportunities, and renewed the request only after being pronounced guilty.

Cited on: Discharging Retained Defense Counsel Before an Idaho Criminal Setting

State v. Wright, 154 Idaho 157, 295 P.3d 1016 (Ct. App. 2013)

The Idaho Court of Appeals REVERSED a misdemeanor conviction for leaving the scene of an accident, holding that Idaho Code § 49-1301(1) applies only where the accident involves another vehicle "driven or attended by any person," and does not reach a single-vehicle accident in which the driver slides off an icy road and strikes a traffic sign. Reading § 49-1301 to cover single-vehicle accidents would render its "driven or attended by any person" language superfluous, and the duty to remain at the scene exists to enable the exchange of information required by § 49-1302 — which has no application where there is no other party to exchange information with. The court noted that Idaho Code § 49-1304 imposes the duty to notify the owner of damaged property, but that Wright had not been charged under that section. A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal.

Cited on: How Serious Is Failing to Report Striking a Highway Fixture

Tarango DeForest Padilla v. State, 158 Idaho 184, 345 P.3d 243 (Ct. App. 2014)

In post-conviction proceedings, a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress is evaluated by examining the probability that the motion would have succeeded: if the motion would likely have been denied, the petitioner fails both Strickland prongs. Where the district court denies such a claim without resolving the factual disputes bearing on whether the suppression motion would have succeeded, and without making findings on (a) the reasonableness of counsel's decision not to file and (b) the likelihood the outcome would have changed, the judgment must be vacated and the matter remanded for those findings.

Cited on: Post-Conviction Relief and Civil Rights Claims After a Drug Conviction

United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2008)

The Ninth Circuit rejected overbreadth and vagueness challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1), holding it constitutional both facially and as applied. Because § 1466A(a)(1) reaches only material that is obscene under the Miller test, it does not suffer the overbreadth defect that doomed the CPPA in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition; the Miller standard itself operates as the safeguard against criminalizing protected speech. The statute's coverage of drawings, cartoons, sculptures and paintings is therefore permissible, the absence of a requirement that an actual minor exist is irrelevant because the provision regulates obscenity rather than Ferber child pornography, and the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The court separately found plain error under the Double Jeopardy Clause where the defendant was convicted of both receipt and possession under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (a)(4)(B) on the same charged conduct, possession being a lesser included offense of receipt, and remanded to vacate one conviction.

Cited on: Federal Obscenity Law and Private Non-Photographic Drawings