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Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)

Given students' diminished expectation of privacy in the school setting, suspicionless drug testing of students can be constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment — though Earls addresses programmatic testing tied to participation in competitive extracurricular activities, not testing imposed on a particular student as part of a disciplinary or expulsion proceeding, so the fit to this consumer's scenario is only partial.

Cited on: Can a School Require a Drug Test at an Expulsion Hearing?

Dalton v. Capital Associated Industries, Inc., 257 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2001)

Concerns the duties of the CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCY, not the employer. Where a background-check company inaccurately reported a criminal conviction to a prospective employer and the applicant lost the job, the Fourth Circuit held that summary judgment for the agency was error: a jury could find the agency negligently violated § 1681e(b) (failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy) and § 1681k (failure to maintain strict procedures for public-record information reported for employment purposes, where the agency did not notify the consumer at the time of transmittal). The court simultaneously AFFIRMED that no reasonable jury could find the violation willful on those facts, so the consumer was limited to actual damages under § 1681o. FCRA imposes no strict liability for reporting inaccuracies.

Cited on: Fired After a Background Check: Your FCRA Rights

Dunbar Housing Authority v. Nesmith, 184 W. Va. 288, 400 S.E.2d 296 (1990)

A PUBLIC HOUSING eviction case (Dunbar Housing Authority, a PHA — not a Section 8 voucher tenancy with a private landlord). The Court recited, as background, that the PHA is bound by federal regulations requiring notice of lease termination and a grievance hearing before eviction proceedings may be filed — the PHA had in fact given both. The actual HOLDING is on waiver and went against the tenant: the circuit court erred in dismissing the eviction suit on the theory that the PHA waived the lease breach by accepting rent after the termination notice. The Court held that acceptance of rent does not automatically waive a forfeiture where the landlord is actively pursuing eviction, that whether a landlord waived a breach turns on the landlord's intent as a question of fact, and that a nonwaiver clause can prevent acceptance of rent from constituting waiver. Reversed and remanded.

Cited on: Challenging a Subsidized-Housing Eviction and Its Record

Feathers v. Detrick, 175 W. Va. 628, 336 S.E.2d 922 (1985)

A person detained in West Virginia on an out-of-state extradition demand may challenge the extradition by petition for habeas corpus, but extradition of a parole violator does not require a judicial determination of probable cause. Where extradition is sought for an offense that already resulted in conviction, the demanding state need only supply the record of conviction and a statement by its Governor that the accused has violated parole — the affidavits and showing of presence in the demanding state required when extradition rests on a mere accusation of criminality are not necessary.

Cited on: How Long a County Can Hold Someone Awaiting Extradition

In re Grandparent Visitation of A.P., 231 W. Va. 38, 743 S.E.2d 346 (2013)

Applying W. Va. Code §§ 48-10-501 and -502 together with the § 48-10-702(b) rebuttable presumption and Troxel v. Granville, the Court REVERSED a grant of grandparent visitation and remanded with directions to enter an order DENYING it, holding that the lower courts erred in finding the presumption rebutted. The controlling principle is that a FIT PARENT'S wishes are entitled to 'special weight' — a court may not override a fit parent's decision on a best-interests analysis alone. Note the limit for this row: the deference the case commands runs to a fit parent, not to any person currently caring for the child; a temporary guardian's wishes are a § 48-10-502 factor but do not carry Troxel's constitutional weight, and § 48-10-702(b)'s presumption is keyed to the custodial parent being the grandparent's own child.

Cited on: Seeking Unsupervised Grandparent Visitation in West Virginia

In re Petition of A.N.T. for Expungement of Records, 238 W. Va. 701, 798 S.E.2d 623 (2017)

Expungement in West Virginia is purely a creature of statute. A circuit court has NO inherent authority to expunge a criminal record where the statutory eligibility criteria are not met, and equitable considerations — the petitioner's emotional circumstances at the time of the offense, her rehabilitation since, and the effect of the record on her professional licensing and employment — are not 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying expungement, because they are the ordinary consequences faced by anyone with a criminal record. The Court reversed an order granting expungement.

Cited on: Expunging a West Virginia Record After Completing Probation

In re Visitation of Cathy L.(M.) v. Mark Brent R., 217 W. Va. 319, 617 S.E.2d 866 (2005)

Applying the same statutory standard — visitation must be in the child's best interests and must not substantially interfere with the parent-child relationship — together with the § 48-10-502 factors and Troxel, the Court REVERSED a grant of grandparent visitation and remanded for entry of an order denying it, holding that the family court failed to give proper weight to the fit adoptive parents' preferences and effectively substituted its own best-interests judgment for theirs. Arose in an ADOPTION context, where the birth family's legal parent-child relationship had been severed and the guardian ad litem recommended denial; the Court noted that a grandparent's showing is 'especially difficult' once an adoption has occurred. Less analogous here, where the grandchild is under a relative's temporary guardianship rather than adopted.

Cited on: Seeking Unsupervised Grandparent Visitation in West Virginia

In re the Extradition of Chandler, 207 W. Va. 520, 534 S.E.2d 385 (2000)

A person held in West Virginia on another state's extradition demand may test the validity of that custody by habeas corpus, but the asylum state's inquiry is NARROW. It is limited to four questions: whether the extradition papers are in proper form; whether a criminal charge is pending in the demanding state; whether the petitioner was present in the demanding state when the offense was committed; and whether the petitioner is the person named in the papers. The extradition proceeding is not the place to argue innocence of the underlying charge, and West Virginia's extradition scheme contains no provision for balancing the equities — the Court rejected exactly that argument and the appellant lost.

Cited on: Out-of-State Capias and Arrest Risk at a West Virginia Hearing

Jaroush v. Cook, 170 W. Va. 714, 296 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1982)

Jaroush v. Cook confirms and applies Teller in the eviction posture: 'where a landlord predicates his right to repossess the premises on the tenant's failure to pay rent and the tenant as a defense alleges that the landlord has breached the implied warranty of habitability, then the tenant must not be immediately dispossessed, but must be afforded an opportunity to prove his allegations.' And: 'If the tenant proves that the implied warranty has been breached, that proof constitutes a defense allowing him, on his election, to retain possession of the premises. If he fails to prove the breach, he can then be dispossessed.' This is a defense available to a tenant IN a pending eviction proceeding. It does not undo an eviction that has already occurred — a tenant who has already been evicted would be looking instead at an affirmative damages claim for breach of the warranty under Teller and W. Va. Code § 37-6-30, and, if a case is still pending or an appeal window is open, at raising the defense there.

Cited on: Repeated Eviction From a Rental With Habitability Defects

Nazario v. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th 213 (4th Cir. 2024)

Pointing a firearm at a person is a threat of deadly force, and the Fourth Amendment can be transgressed by an unwarranted threat of deadly force. The Fourth Circuit held it can be unconstitutional to hold a person at PROLONGED gunpoint where that person is COMPLIANT and PRESENTS NO DANGER to the public or to officers, and found the plaintiff had sufficient evidence of a Fourth Amendment violation on facts involving a prolonged roadside detention at gunpoint accompanied by explicit verbal death threats. Whether force is excessive remains an objective-reasonableness inquiry turning on the specific circumstances.

Cited on: Police Questioning of a Minor and Use of Force at Arrest

R.K. v. St. Mary's Medical Center, Inc., 229 W. Va. 712, 735 S.E.2d 715 (2012)

Common-law tort claims based upon the wrongful disclosure of medical or personal health information are not preempted by HIPAA, because such state-law claims are not inconsistent with HIPAA and instead complement it by enhancing the penalties for its violation. A patient whose confidential medical information was improperly accessed and disclosed by hospital employees may therefore pursue state-law claims against the hospital, and dismissal of those claims on HIPAA-preemption grounds is error.

Cited on: Hospital Portal Disclosed a Foster Parent's Contact Information

Ross Stanley v. Carolyn Haynes Stanley, 233 W. Va. 505, 759 S.E.2d 452 (2014)

Where ONE spouse unilaterally conveyed real estate to her adult children during the marriage while retaining a life estate, and did not give the other spouse the notice required by W. Va. Code § 43-1-2(b), the remedy in § 43-1-2(d) applies and the value of the conveyed real estate is included in the conveying spouse's marital estate for equitable distribution, provided the divorce occurs within five years of the conveyance. The Court reversed the circuit court and reinstated the family court order that had included the property's value.

Cited on: Life Estate Rights in the Marital Home During Divorce

Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007)

'Willfully fails to comply' in FCRA's civil liability provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a), reaches reckless violations as well as knowing ones, so a defendant need not have acted knowingly to be exposed to statutory and punitive damages. But the Court simultaneously set a demanding standard for recklessness: a company does not act recklessly if its reading of the statute, though ultimately wrong, was 'objectively reasonable' and no authoritative guidance or circuit precedent had warned it away from that reading. On that basis both defendants escaped willfulness liability. A merely negligent violation supports only actual damages under § 1681o.

Cited on: Fired After a Background Check: Your FCRA Rights

Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878 (4th Cir. 2022)

A § 1983 claim challenging an unconstitutional search and seizure accrues at the time of the search itself, not when the resulting criminal charges are later dismissed. The court rejected the plaintiffs' favorable-termination accrual argument, distinguishing such a claim from a malicious-prosecution claim, and affirmed dismissal of the claims as time-barred under West Virginia's two-year limitations period. A claim resting on a defective search warrant can therefore expire years before the prosecution ends.

Cited on: Proving Police Lacked Probable Cause for a Search Warrant

State ex rel. Coryell v. Gooden, 193 W. Va. 461, 457 S.E.2d 138 (1995)

Habeas corpus is the vehicle for contesting custody under a Governor's rendition warrant issued in response to another state's extradition request. A rendition warrant satisfies the requirement that it recite the facts necessary to its validity if it gives the person sought reasonable notice of the nature of the crime charged in the demanding state. In assessing the sufficiency of the warrant in that habeas proceeding, the circuit court MAY look beyond the warrant itself and examine the underlying documents filed by the demanding state in support of its extradition request — the requisition, the application for requisition, the criminal complaint, and the arrest warrant.

Cited on: Out-of-State Capias and Arrest Risk at a West Virginia Hearing

State ex rel. Thompson v. Pomponio, 233 W. Va. 212, 757 S.E.2d 636 (2014)

Where a defendant has performed his obligations under a plea agreement and the circuit court has dismissed charges pursuant to that agreement, the State may not later reprosecute those dismissed charges. Ambiguity in the plea agreement — such as silence on whether the dismissal was with prejudice — is construed in the defendant's favor, the agreement is binding, and the defendant is entitled to a writ of prohibition compelling specific performance, including dismissal of the reinstated charges with prejudice and release from custody if the challenged indictment is the sole basis for confinement.

Cited on: Can a Prosecutor Reopen a Plea Agreement After It Is Signed?

State v. Scarbro, 229 W. Va. 164, 727 S.E.2d 840 (W. Va. 2012)

In a prosecution for fraudulent use of a bank conveyance or access device under W. Va. Code § 61-3C-13, the defendant was charged with five counts, acquitted by the jury on four, and the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the single remaining conviction and remanded for a new trial because the trial court improperly excluded a co-participant's prior inconsistent statement — a statement that he believed the card was his ex-girlfriend's — under Rule 613(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. The case shows that this charge is tried on the State's proof, that a defendant is entitled to put in impeachment evidence bearing on whether he knew the card was not his, and that the exclusion of such evidence can require reversal where it 'places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt.'

Cited on: Felony Access Device Charges and the Knowledge Element

Teller v. McCoy, 162 W. Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978)

Teller v. McCoy is the decision that adopted the implied warranty of habitability in West Virginia residential leases and treated lease covenants as mutually dependent rather than independent. Answering certified questions, the Court held that 'breach by the landlord of the implied warranty of habitability, a material covenant upon which the duty to pay rent depends, may be raised as a defense in a landlord's action for rent,' and expressly held 'that breach of the implied warranty is a defense to an action for unlawful detainer.' Damages for breach 'are measured by the difference between the fair market value of the premises if they had been as warranted and the fair rental value of the premises as they were during the occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe and unsanitary condition,' and the tenant 'may additionally recover damages for annoyance and inconvenience proven to have resulted from the breach.' The Court also set the limits: the breach 'must be of a substantial nature rendering the premises uninhabitable and unfit,' so minor code violations do not entitle the tenant to a rent reduction; the tenant 'is under an obligation to give landlord notice of a deficiency or defect not known to the latter'; a landlord is not liable for a defect caused by the tenant's own wrongful conduct; the Court declined to adopt a 'repair and deduct' remedy; and where only part of the rent obligation is suspended, the tenant must be given an opportunity to pay the balance or judgment will be entered for the landlord.

Cited on: Repeated Eviction From a Rental With Habitability Defects

United States v. Peters, 60 F.4th 855 (4th Cir. 2023)

Reasonable suspicion under Terry must be particularized to the individual stopped. A seizure premised on a suspicion of trespass built from generalized and uncorroborated components — that police records did not show the person as a resident, an uncorroborated confidential-informant tip that he sold drugs near a building he was merely walking past, the area's general reputation for drug activity, and his companionship with someone else believed barred (whom the officers let walk away) — does not amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion, and the evidence recovered from the stop must be suppressed.

Cited on: Challenging a Pat-Down Based Only on a Walking-Through-Yards Call

Zsigray v. Langman, 243 W. Va. 163, 842 S.E.2d 716 (2020) (No. 18-0461, decided Mar. 27, 2020)

A signed opinion with syllabus points holding: (1) a private-figure defamation plaintiff must prove a defamatory statement, a NONPRIVILEGED communication to a third party, falsity, reference to the plaintiff, at least negligence by the publisher, and resulting injury (Crump v. Beckley Newspapers); (2) a judicial fact witness has ABSOLUTE immunity from a defamation claim based on relevant testimony given in a judicial proceeding — this defeated part of the claim outright; (3) statements made to a law-enforcement officer during an investigation are NOT absolutely privileged but may carry a QUALIFIED privilege — a good-faith statement about a matter in which the speaker has an interest or duty, published only to those with a legitimate interest — which is defeated by bad motive, and whether a qualifiedly privileged occasion exists is a question of law for the court where the facts are undisputed; and (4) the four elements of intentional/reckless infliction of emotional distress, with the court deciding as a threshold matter whether conduct can be regarded as extreme and outrageous. Disposition: dismissal of the defamation claim reversed only as to the statements to the investigating trooper (because bad motive had been alleged); summary judgment for the defendant on the outrage/IIED claims AFFIRMED.

Cited on: Suing Over Statements Made by a Former Police Official