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Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725 (1978)

Cited for the pure comparative proposition — recovery reduced in proportion to the claimant's own fault rather than barred — which the text of § 1714(a) does not state, and which is the point that answers the reader's assumption that her fault defeats her claim.

Cited on: Disputing an Injury Claim Brought by an At-Fault Driver · Injured After Striking a Horse Loose on the Highway · Fault in a Left-Turn Collision With a Bicyclist +92 more

Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958)

Cited for the proposition that an insurer which unreasonably refuses a within-limits settlement can be answerable for the whole judgment, including the excess. That proposition is judge-made and is not stated by any statute, and it is the sentence that answers how this reader protects a home from an excess judgment.

Cited on: Protecting a Home From a Judgment Above Your Policy Limits · When Your Insurer Asks Whether to Settle or Deny · When Damages Exceed Your Auto Policy Limits +3 more

Czubinsky v. Doctors Hospital, 139 Cal. App. 3d 361 (1983)

Hospital staff negligence — cited for the principle that a hospital answers for negligence by staff it employs, which is why identifying the correct defendant among a nurse practitioner, a hospital and a physician is a legal question rather than a form-filling one.

Cited on: Malpractice Deadlines and Defendants When Filing Without a Lawyer · When a Surgical Complication Becomes Medical Malpractice · Bringing a Medical Malpractice Claim Against a Hospital

Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center, 8 Cal. 4th 992 (1994)

The standard of care in professional negligence must be proved by expert testimony unless the conduct required is within lay common knowledge.

Cited on: Defective dentures and a reimbursement promise that never arrived · Told you had cancer, then told you did not: misdiagnosis claims in California · Cellulitis treated as an abscess: when a misdiagnosis is malpractice

Henry v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 4th 440 (2008)

The original tortfeasor's liability for an injury made worse by negligent medical care is a separate basis of liability predicated on the tortfeasor's own culpable conduct — the reason the premises claim and the malpractice claim can travel together.

Cited on: Suing a Business and a Surgeon for the Same Injury · Early Discharge After Crash Surgery and the Malpractice Clock · Recovering for a Bone Infection That Followed a Crash Injury

Anderson v. Latimer, 166 Cal. App. 3d 667 (1985)

Cited for the judge-made allocation point — fault divisible between an unlawful left-turner and a speeding oncoming driver — because the insurer will argue this reader's speed and neither § 21801 nor § 22107 says what happens when both drivers are said to have erred.

Cited on: Proving Fault for an Unsafe Left Turn · Mid-Block Left Turn Into Oncoming Traffic

Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659 (1969)

Cited for the limit it places on an insurer that waits until a claim to look for grounds to rescind. Scope stated plainly in the body: it concerns rescission for misrepresentation, not denial of a claim for a misstatement made while reporting it.

Cited on: Correcting A False Accident Report Made To Your Own Insurer · Collision Coverage Added Shortly Before a Single-Car Crash

Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, 145 Cal. App. 4th 220 (2006)

Holds § 2802 requires indemnification but creates no independent employer duty to defend the sued employee. Cited because it cuts against the reader: handing the papers to the boss did not put a response on file, which is how the default happened.

Cited on: Default Entered Against the Employee, Not the Employer · Sued Personally After a Crash on a Delivery Job

Filosa v. Alagappan, 59 Cal. App. 5th 772 (2020)

Modern application of the same discovery-rule framework under CCP § 340.5. Cited only for that framework, and only on the published record.

Cited on: Missed Fractures and the Malpractice Discovery Deadline · Deadline to Sue for a Misdiagnosis Discovered Late

Jordan v. City of Sacramento, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2007)

A city ordinance shifting civil liability for defective sidewalks to the abutting property owner is effective, and the city is entitled to indemnity from the owner if held liable. Cited because it is what makes the answer depend on the reader's local ordinance rather than on § 5610 alone.

Cited on: Do I Have A Case After Falling On A Lifted Sidewalk · Who Is Liable For A Sidewalk Defect, The City Or The Owner

Moreno v. Visser Ranch, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 5th 568 (2018)

Cited because the reader's actual question is who answers besides the driver, and the employer's vicarious responsibility for an on-duty employee driver is judge-made and appears in no statute.

Cited on: Who Pays When a Delivery Truck Hits a Parked Car · Personal Insurance Requests After a Company-Vehicle Crash

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Haight, 205 Cal. App. 3d 223 (1988)

Cited for the point that California courts enforce named-driver exclusions according to their terms, which is why an excluded driver generally cannot look to that policy for his own operation of the car — the step that puts him inside Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.4(a).

Cited on: Excluded Driver's Right to Pain and Suffering Damages · Two Insurers Deny a Claim on a Borrowed Car

United Services Automobile Assn. v. Pegos, 107 Cal. App. 4th 392 (2003)

Restates and applies the Barrera rule — investigate within a reasonable time or forfeit the right to rescind — in the context of a vehicle added to an existing policy. Cited as the modern application of the same rule.

Cited on: Insurer Voiding a Motorcycle Policy After a Claim · Correcting A False Accident Report Made To Your Own Insurer

Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. App. 5th 1121 (2023)

The safe harbor for routine loss of electronic evidence does not protect a party already under a duty to preserve, and that duty arises when litigation is reasonably foreseeable.

Cited on: Police refused to release intersection camera footage after a crash · Getting the whole surveillance video when the other side shows only part

Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654 (1944)

Cited only for the treatment-aggravation principle, as the older statement behind Henry — never for release or allocation questions.

Cited on: Early Discharge After Crash Surgery and the Malpractice Clock

Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825 (1962)

Restates the same unity-of-interest / inequitable-result test and enumerates the classic factors — commingling of funds, disregard of corporate formalities, diversion of assets. Cited to tell the reader what records answer an alter-ego claim.

Cited on: Why an Owner Is Sued Personally for an Employee's Crash

Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659 (1969)

An auto liability insurer must reasonably investigate insurability within a reasonable time after the policy issues; failing that, it loses as against an innocent accident victim the right to rescind for an application misrepresentation, though it may still pursue its insured. Cited as the reason an after-the-claim attempt to undo a policy is not the last word.

Cited on: Insurer Voiding a Motorcycle Policy After a Claim

Boicourt v. Amex Assurance Co., 78 Cal. App. 4th 1390 (2000)

An insurer's refusal to disclose policy limits can expose it to bad-faith liability even without a formal settlement demand. Cited to explain why a decision not to disclose is worth questioning, and framed as the carrier's duty rather than the insured's.

Cited on: Policy Limits Demands After an At-Fault Injury Crash

Bonivert v. City of Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2018)

The Ninth Circuit refused to extend the emergency-aid exception to an officer's 'inflexible assumption' rather than a reasonable belief, holding the record showed at least triable issues of fact as to whether violence was imminent and whether the warrantless home entry was justified, and concluding that 'the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity under the emergency aid exception.' A warrantless entry into a home requires an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to protect someone from serious harm, judged on the circumstances known to the officers.

Cited on: Suing Police for a Home Search Triggered by a False 911 Call

Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal. 5th 204 (2021)

Two-step framework for a duty to protect against a third party's criminal conduct: special relationship (or other basis for a duty) first, then the policy factors. Cited to explain why a delivery platform is not responsible for a stranger's shooting merely because the driver was working.

Cited on: Can a Delivery Driver Sue the App After Being Shot?

Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064 (1992)

A patient may recover as a direct victim for serious emotional distress caused by the provider's negligence, without physical injury.

Cited on: Told you had cancer, then told you did not: misdiagnosis claims in California

Carson v. Mercury Ins. Co., 210 Cal. App. 4th 409 (2012)

Cited for the pre-accident safe, mechanical and cosmetic condition standard against which a repair offer is measured, which is the proposition the reader needs and which no statute or regulation states in those terms.

Cited on: Disputing a Repair Offer That Leaves a Bumper Unsafe

Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC, 219 Cal. App. 4th 337 (2013)

No § 2802 indemnity for self-chosen counsel where the employer or its insurer has already offered a competent, conflict-free defense. Cited to warn the reader against refusing an offered defense without advice.

Cited on: Sued Personally After a Crash on a Delivery Job

Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1 (1998)

There is no tort cause of action for intentional spoliation by a party when the loss is known before trial; the remedies are the evidentiary inference and discovery sanctions.

Cited on: Getting the whole surveillance video when the other side shows only part

Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425 (1967)

An insurer may not reject a settlement within limits to serve its own interest unless it is willing to absorb the excess loss that results. Cited as the affirmative statement of the same duty.

Cited on: At-Fault Rear-End: Excess Exposure and the Duty to Settle

Davert v. Larson, 163 Cal. App. 3d 407 (1985)

Reversed summary judgment for the landowner, holding a triable duty exists to keep a horse from escaping onto the highway — the reason this reader has a claim rather than a dead end.

Cited on: Injured After Striking a Horse Loose on the Highway

Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 50 Cal. App. 3d 449 (1975)

Reads Lab. Code § 2802 to require an employer to indemnify an employee sued over on-the-job conduct — the reader's assumption that the employer would absorb the suit is right about cost.

Cited on: Default Entered Against the Employee, Not the Employer

Dufresne v. Elite Insurance Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 916 (1972)

A broker's signature given on only oral authority is not a valid written rejection, so the uninsured motorist coverage remained in force — the closest fit to the reader's facts. The answer flags that the opinion discusses an earlier version of § 11580.2 and that the current statutory text governs.

Cited on: Uninsured Motorist Coverage Without a Signed Rejection

Dumas v. Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593 (1991)

In a delayed-diagnosis case, causation must be proved to a reasonable medical probability by expert testimony; the court declined a relaxed lost-chance standard.

Cited on: Cellulitis treated as an abscess: when a misdiagnosis is malpractice

Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, 63 Cal. 4th 75 (2016)

Premises negligence is professional negligence only when the premises or equipment is reasonably required to treat or accommodate the patient's condition.

Cited on: A fall on a freshly mopped floor at a residential treatment facility

Halajian v. D & B Towing, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2012)

Whether a warrantless impound is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment's community-caretaking exception is analyzed under the factors of Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858: whether the vehicle was safely and securely parked, whether its registration was valid, and whether an owner with a valid driver's license was available to take it. Halajian upheld the impound precisely BECAUSE 'none of these three factors is present in this case' — so where all three are present, the community-caretaking justification is at its weakest.

Cited on: Challenging an Allegedly Unlawful Vehicle Impound During an Arrest

Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528 (1971)

A driver suddenly stricken by an illness rendering him unconscious is judged on negligence principles, not strict liability; the court refused a strict-liability instruction and affirmed a defense verdict for an epileptic driver who had no warning of the seizure. Cited because it cuts against the reader: the insurer can defend on it. Facts and holding confirmed from the opinion (Descrybe c2112808) 2026-09-05.

Cited on: Rear-Ended by a Driver Who Suffered a Fatal Medical Emergency

Haynie v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 4th 1061 (2001)

The investigatory-records exemption covers inquiries to determine whether a violation occurred and the investigation of one detected, but not everything officers do.

Cited on: Police refused to release intersection camera footage after a crash

Hibbs v. Allstate Insurance Company, 193 Cal. App. 4th 809

An insurer may elect to repair rather than pay value, but unauthorized repairs plus a prejudicial subrogation can support a bad-faith claim. Cited for the limit on the insurer's election to repair.

Cited on: Disputing a Repair-or-Total Decision on Aftermarket Vehicle Damage

In re Humphrey, 11 Cal. 5th 135 (2021)

Conditioning freedom solely on whether an arrestee can afford bail is unconstitutional. Where a financial condition of release is nonetheless necessary, the court must consider the arrestee's ability to pay the stated amount and may not effectively detain the arrestee solely because he lacked the resources to post bail; the court must also consider whether nonmonetary conditions — electronic monitoring, check-ins, community housing, treatment — would reasonably assure appearance and public safety. Detention without a financial condition is permissible only on a clear-and-convincing finding that no less restrictive condition would suffice. A person facing a bail-schedule figure can therefore ask for a reduction or nonmonetary release rather than simply posting the scheduled amount.

Cited on: Whether to Post Bail After a California DUI Accident Arrest

In re Walton, 99 Cal. App. 4th 934 (2002)

A person held under an interstate rendition order may test it by habeas corpus, but the asylum-state court's review is narrow. Quoting Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978), the court held that once the governor has granted extradition a court considering release on habeas corpus 'can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive' — 'historic facts readily verifiable.' Everything else, including alleged constitutional violations that might result from extradition, must be raised in the demanding state's courts. Walton's petition was denied.

Cited on: Contesting a Montana Fugitive Warrant Held on an Old DUI in California

Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240

California distinguishes between an ex-partner's verbal disclosures about a relationship and his publication of the underlying private material itself. Mayweather's statements that Jackson had an abortion and his comments about her cosmetic surgery concerned an issue of public interest and were not actionable, so the anti-SLAPP motion was granted as to defamation, false light, and the portion of the public-disclosure claim resting on those statements. But Jackson made a prima facie showing that Mayweather's posting of the actual sonogram image and summary medical report was a 'morbid and sensational' prying into her private life; to that limited extent the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion was affirmed and her public-disclosure-of-private-facts claim proceeds.

Cited on: Removing a Nonconsensually Posted Video and Your Legal Options

Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020)

When an officer runs a vehicle's license plate, learns the registered owner's license is revoked, and lacks information negating the inference that the owner is driving, an investigative traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Reasonable suspicion requires only 'a particularized and objective basis' to suspect wrongdoing, and courts must permit officers to make commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior; the inference need not be grounded in the officer's training or experience. The Court emphasized that 'the scope of this holding is narrow' and that reasonable suspicion still turns on the totality of the circumstances, so additional facts known to the officer might dispel it.

Cited on: Must Police Produce Dash-Cam Proof of a Stop, and Jail Medication Denial

Klem v. Access Insurance Company, 17 Cal. App. 5th 595

Total-loss 'uneconomical to repair' status is an objective cost-versus-value test, not the insurer's unilateral say-so. Cited because the insurer here is refusing to total the car on its own appraisal; the answer states plainly that the same rule can support the insurer if its documented figures hold up.

Cited on: Disputing a Repair-or-Total Decision on Aftermarket Vehicle Damage

Lee v. Department of Parks & Recreation, 38 Cal. App. 5th 206 (2019)

A park stairway linking a parking lot to a campground and marked trails was a trail, or an integral part of one, under § 831.4(b), so the state was immune from a slip-and-fall claim.

Cited on: A fall on wet tile beach stairs with no grip strips or warning signs

McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 204 L. Ed. 2d 506 (2019)

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim alleging that a government official FABRICATED EVIDENCE used to pursue a criminal judgment does not begin to run until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff's favor — in McDonough's case, his acquittal. The Court reasoned by analogy to malicious prosecution, whose favorable-termination requirement avoids parallel criminal and civil litigation and collateral attacks on criminal judgments.

Cited on: Suing an Officer and Agency After Winning a California DUI Case

Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 53 Cal. 3d 753 (1991)

California, unlike most states, prohibits 'driving' rather than 'operating' or 'being in actual physical control,' and Mercer holds that 'section 23152 requires proof of volitional movement of a vehicle.' On facts closely matching this row — a man found asleep, slumped over the wheel of a lawfully parked car with the lights on and engine running — the court held the warrantless misdemeanor arrest was not lawful, because the officer never saw the vehicle move and so the offense did not occur in his 'presence' under Pen. Code § 836; the license revocation therefore could not stand. The court expressly limited itself, however: it did NOT hold that observed movement is required to support a criminal § 23152 conviction, and it said its holding does not 'call in question the propriety of convictions under section 23152 based on mere circumstantial evidence of vehicle movement.' It also flagged the statutory exceptions to the 'presence' requirement in Veh. Code § 40300.5, which permit a warrantless DUI arrest where the person was involved in a traffic accident or is observed in or about a vehicle obstructing a roadway.

Cited on: DUI Charges for Sleeping in a Parked, Running Car

Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290 (1985)

States the two-part alter-ego test — unity of interest and ownership such that separate personalities no longer exist, plus an inequitable result if the acts are treated as the corporation's alone. Cited to explain when an owner can be reached personally.

Cited on: Why an Owner Is Sued Personally for an Employee's Crash

Mission Insurance Co. v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 508 (1965)

A statutory waiver of uninsured motorist coverage must be complete and in the form the statute requires; a partial or informal cutting-back is ineffective. Cited for the strict-construction principle that answers the reader's question about an unsigned rejection.

Cited on: Uninsured Motorist Coverage Without a Signed Rejection

Molinar v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 99 Cal. App. 5th 1228 (2024)

Used to show that a claimed pre-loss cancellation is testable against notice requirements, not to state a holding beyond the verified role note.

Cited on: When an Insurer Claims the Policy Was Cancelled Before the Crash

Moreno v. Visser Ranch, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 5th 568 (Ct. App. 2018)

Supplies the governing test for when an employer answers for an employee's use of a vehicle, and reversed summary judgment for the employer because the scope-of-employment facts had to be decided at trial. Cited for the doctrinal test only — its facts were a commute-adjacent employee drive, not a valet or a hit-and-run — and the answer says so.

Cited on: Hotel Liability When a Valet Hits Someone and Flees

Myers v. Quesenberry, 144 Cal. App. 3d 888; 193 Cal. Rptr. 733

Held that a physician's duty to warn a patient against driving while medication impaired him extended to a third party the patient injured. Cited as the closest California authority on a provider's duty arising out of medicating and releasing a patient — and cited with the scope stated plainly, because its holding concerns a person the patient injured, not the patient's own injuries after discharge.

Cited on: Hit-and-Run Injury After Discharge While Medicated

New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 4th 1403 (2008)

Evidence or issue sanctions for missing surveillance footage required a violated order compelling production, and a late motion to compel waived it; the inference instruction for intentionally destroyed evidence remained available.

Cited on: Getting the whole surveillance video when the other side shows only part

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Southern California Edison Co., 208 Cal.App.4th 1400, 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 568 (2012)

The court held that Edison, a privately owned utility, 'may be liable for inverse condemnation' and affirmed the judgment, reasoning that a property owner damaged by utility operations 'suffers a disproportionate share of the cost of the public improvement regardless of whether the utility is governmentally or privately owned.' The court further rejected Edison's argument that a reasonableness standard borrowed from the flood-control cases should apply, agreeing with the trial court that a STRICT liability standard governs a privately owned utility's inverse-condemnation liability.

Cited on: Legal Claims and Deadlines for Palisades Wildfire Losses

Pagan v. City of San Rafael, 119 Cal. App. 5th 853 (2026)

A wet roadway curve that was open and obvious imposed no duty to warn, and evidence that a condition could have been made safer does not establish a dangerous condition.

Cited on: A fall on wet tile beach stairs with no grip strips or warning signs