Free Legal Help in Texas

Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983)

Invitee duty: reasonable care to protect against unreasonable risks the occupier knows or should know of. Cited for the duty framework only; the produce-display application is not stated.

Cited on: Premises Liability For A Malfunctioning Automatic Entry Gate · Property Owner Facing a Claim After a Fall in the Yard · Getting care for a fracture while your slip-and-fall claim is pending +10 more

Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992)

Premises liability elements including actual or constructive knowledge, and the holding that creating the condition permits but does not compel a knowledge finding. Cited for the elements the reader must prove.

Cited on: Premises Liability For A Malfunctioning Automatic Entry Gate · Property Owner Facing a Claim After a Fall in the Yard · Getting care for a fracture while your slip-and-fall claim is pending +10 more

Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1987)

Negligent-entrustment elements: entrustment to an unlicensed, incompetent or reckless driver whom the owner knew or should have known to be so, plus that driver's negligence proximately causing the crash.

Cited on: Vehicle Owner Liability When Someone Else Was Driving · Recovering From an Unlicensed, Uninsured Texas Driver · Suing An Uninsured Driver Who Totaled Your Own Car +6 more

J & D Towing, LLC v. American Alternative Ins. Corp., 478 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. 2016)

Loss-of-use damages are recoverable even when a vehicle is totally destroyed, subject to foreseeability, traceability, non-speculativeness, and a reasonable replacement period.

Cited on: Totaled by an On-Duty Rideshare Driver in Texas · Damages After A Permanent Hand Injury And Total Loss · Who Pays For A Rental Car After A Rear-End Crash +3 more

Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 2018)

Whether a worker is an employee rather than an independent contractor turns on whether the hiring party has the OVERALL right to control the progress, details, and methods of operations of the work — whether or not it actually exercises that right as to any particular task. The Court expressly rejected evaluating employee status on a task-by-task basis, holding that a worker does not shift between employee and contractor status depending on the specific task at hand; task-specific control analysis belongs to supervisory liability for an independent contractor's acts, not to employment status. (Limestone Products' five factors — independence of the worker's business, who furnishes tools and materials, right to control progress, term of employment, and method of payment — remain the control-analysis guide.)

Cited on: Injury Claims After a Work Truck Brake Failure With No Coverage · Employer Closing While a Work-Truck Lawsuit Is Pending · Employer Liability For A Suspended-License Employee's Crash +3 more

J & D Towing, LLC v. American Alternative Insurance Corp., 478 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. 2016)

Loss-of-use damages are recoverable even for a totally destroyed vehicle, subject to foreseeability, traceability, non-speculativeness and a reasonable replacement period.

Cited on: Total Loss Payout Below the Car Loan Balance in Texas · Recovering Lost Income After a Total-Loss Vehicle Claim · Landlord Liability for Damage From a Known Hazardous Tree +2 more

In re Essex Insurance Company, 450 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam)

An injured party cannot sue the tortfeasor's liability insurer directly, even for declaratory relief, until the insured's liability is established. Cited to explain honestly why the reader has no leverage over the other driver's insurer; the proposition is judge-made and no statute states it.

Cited on: Unequal Settlement Offers to Two Claimants From One Crash · Recourse When the At-Fault Insurer Stalls a Property Claim · Can You Sue the Other Driver's Insurer Directly in Texas? +1 more

Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1969)

When a client without good cause discharges a contingency-fee lawyer before the work is completed, the lawyer may recover on the contract for the amount of the compensation it sets.

Cited on: When Your Injury Lawyer Stops Returning Calls · Getting care for a fracture while your slip-and-fall claim is pending · Changing Lawyers on a Contingency Fee Injury Case

Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974)

Strict liability for an animal the owner knows or should know is vicious; ordinary contributory negligence is not a defense to that claim, though a true voluntary assumption of a known risk is; negligence governs animals not shown to be vicious.

Cited on: Recovering for a Dog Bite Injury Under Texas Law · Dog Owner Liability When the Bite Victim Provoked the Dog · Dog Owner Liability When a Bite Injures a Child

Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006)

A contingent-fee lawyer discharged without cause may seek quantum meruit or the contract fee, collected from any damages the client later recovers.

Cited on: When Your Injury Lawyer Stops Returning Calls · Changing Lawyers on a Contingency Fee Injury Case

Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2015)

In most cases a property owner owes an invitee no duty to warn of or make safe a danger that is open and obvious or already known to the invitee, subject to exceptions including necessary use and third-party criminal activity.

Cited on: Tripping over a gas pump hose: when the station can be responsible

Brinson Ford, Inc. v. Alger, 228 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam)

A condition is not unreasonably dangerous simply because it is not foolproof; a ramp that met applicable safety standards and was outlined in yellow striping did not pose an unreasonable risk as a matter of law.

Cited on: Tripping over a gas pump hose: when the station can be responsible

Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1988)

Bystander recovery requires presence at the scene and contemporaneous perception of the accident; learning of the injury afterward does not qualify. Cited as a limiting case, against false hope, not for recovery.

Cited on: Emotional Distress Claims After A Texas Car Accident

Gibbs v. Jackson, 990 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1999)

No common-law duty to keep livestock off a farm-to-market road absent a local stock law. Cited as the limiting case, against the assumption that repeated escapes alone establish liability.

Cited on: Livestock Owner Liability When Cattle Cause A Highway Crash

Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974) (op. on reh'g)

Strict liability for an animal the owner knows or should know is vicious, with contributory negligence unavailable as a defense to that claim; negligence governs animals not shown to be vicious. Cited for the negligence track that fits a loose, non-vicious dog.

Cited on: When A Loose Dog Causes A Texas Motorcycle Crash

Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999) (Interim Decision #3423)

The Board held that under Arizona law the offense of aggravated DUI under Ariz. Rev. Stat. sec. 28-697(A)(1) / sec. 28-1383(A)(1) — which requires that the driver know he or she is prohibited from driving under any circumstances because the license is suspended, cancelled, revoked, or refused — IS a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board reached that result precisely because that added knowledge element is absent from simple DUI: 'a simple DUI offense is such a marginal crime,' but 'when that crime is committed by an individual who knows that he or she is prohibited from driving, the offense becomes such a deviance from the accepted rules of contemporary morality that it amounts to a crime involving moral turpitude.'

Cited on: How a Pending DUI Charge Affects a U.S. Work Visa

Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78 (BIA 2001) (Interim Decision #3449)

The Board held that under Arizona law the offense of aggravated DUI based on having two or more prior DUI convictions (Ariz. Rev. Stat. sec. 28-697(A)(2), now sec. 28-1383) is NOT a crime involving moral turpitude, distinguishing Matter of Lopez-Meza. The Board's reasoning was that the 'aggravating' element there was merely the fact of prior convictions, requiring no culpable mental state, and that multiple convictions for an offense that is individually not turpitudinous do not aggregate into one that is. In reaching that result the Board reaffirmed Lopez-Meza's determination that a simple DUI under Arizona law is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it 'requires no culpable mental state, such as intent or knowledge.'

Cited on: How a Pending DUI Charge Affects a U.S. Work Visa

Stephen Allen, Jr. v. Entergy Louisiana, L., 866 F.3d 610 (2017) — Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

The FLSA guarantees to all covered employees who work more than forty hours in one week overtime pay at a rate of 1.5 times their regular pay rate.

Cited on: Unpaid Overtime Claim for a Salaried, Hourly-Billed Employee

in Re Expunction, 465 S.W.3d 283 (2015) — Court of Appeals of Texas

We reverse and render judgment denying the request for an expunction.

Cited on: Expunging Criminal Cases That Were Fully Dismissed